by John T. Tengdin --
Editor-in-Chief
April
1999
Many of us have the vision, so far unrealized,
of one high performance LAN in a substation for both protection and control. Just a few
years ago, it was common for protection to be the sole domain of electromechanical or
solid state analog relays. There were no communications ports. Remote control, if it
existed, was via hard wired connections to a SCADA RTU. Local control was all hard wired.
Then along came the first microprocessor based protective relays. Continuing past
practices, they were primarily for protection, with limited control capability.
Five
years ago, there was serious discussion of substation architecture with two separate LANs
one for protection and the second for monitoring and control. It was felt that if
the functions were split between the two LANs, then the performance requirements for the
relay LAN could more easily be met. The concern was the effect of large file transfers and
SCADA updates on the relay performance.
Work had begun on EPRI Project RP3599 Requirements Specification for Substation
Integrated Protection, Control and Data Acquisition. During the course of developing that
specification, the IEEE Power System Relaying Committee (PSRC) did an extensive review.
Out of those discussions came an agreement that protective relay tripping over a LAN
required the delivery of a tripping signal application to application in 4
milliseconds or less. That requirement has been stable since December 1996.
The 4 ms performance requirement is most critical during a major substation event, so a
number of studies were undertaken to 1) define the level of background traffic to be used,
and 2) measure message delivery times with that background traffic load. These studies
showed that the background traffic over a wide range (up to 5 X a very heavy load) without
having a measurable effect on message delivery times. However, there was a major effect
based on the number of messages. Stating this another way, creating a separate LAN for
control and monitoring would have no effect on relay performance. And since current design
microprocessor relays have extensive monitoring and control capability, a separate control
LAN would mean two ports into each relay.
So what is a likely maximum number of protection messages to be generated by a major
substation event? Commonwealth Edison relay engineers looked into this question. Starting
with a typical 345 138 kV substation, they assumed that a tornado had hit a tower
carrying 2 345 kV and 2 138 kV lines, creating faults on all four lines.
With redundant protection and wired connections, they found that the event would trigger
144 discrete relay outputs. Analysis showed that, in a messaging system, some of these
outputs could be combined in one message, and that some of the messages could be
multicast. With these combinations, the number of required messages was reduced to 38, all
arriving on the LAN at essentially the same time and to be delivered in < 4 ms.
Under EPRI sponsorship, SRS Technologies ran
simulation studies to determine the performance of 10 MB and 100 MB shared and switched
hub Ethernet LANs. They studied the effect of simultaneity on the delivery times. That is,
what is the effect if all the messages arrive within one microsecond, 10 µs, 100 µs, or
within 1 ms. They also varied the number of messages from 10 to 100 to determine worst
case performance.
These simulations showed that a 10 MB shared hub LAN can deliver ~ 15
messages in < 4 ms. They also showed that the 10 MB switched hub, and both the 100 MB
shared and switched hub Ethernet LANs could deliver at least 100 messages within 4 ms. The
details of these simulation studies were presented by your editor at the IEEE Power
Engineering Society 1999 Winter Meeting in New York. The Conference paper was titled
"LAN Congestion Scenario and Performance Evaluation".
Thus the potential is clearly indicated by this simulation study that an Ethernet LAN
can support very heavy message traffic. We also recognize that it will be some time before
substation LANs are used for primary protective relay tripping duty. The PSRC Working
Group H5 is underway on a new IEEE standard PC37.115. It has a very long title
"Standard Test Method for Use in the Evaluation of Message Communications between
Intelligent Electronic Devices in an Integrated Substation Protection, Control, and Data
Acquisition System". Given the time it takes to develop and gain approval of a new
IEEE standard, it will be late in the year 2000 before the document reached the balloting
stage.
But the industry cant wait. Many projects are in the wings, with utilities
unwilling to commit based solely on simulation studies. What is needed now is true
performance testing.
In the meantime, under the umbrella of the Utility Initiative, a number of substation
LAN projects, using the UCA 2 protocol, are planned for substation installation or
laboratory testing in 1999. There has already been some limited interoperability testing,
to prove that an operator at an HMI can read data out of a relay. There has been only
limited testing of the multicast method, developed in the initiative, and needed to reduce
LAN traffic.
Simulations are not enough. The testing by one manufacturer of communications between
his products is not enough. Relay engineers want to see the results of actual timed tests,
from the start of an event (fault) to the energizing of a trip coil, and with a
combination of several IED manufacturers products. Without such tests, there will be
limited industry support for a single substation LAN.
Yet none of the EPRI sponsored Utility Initiative projects have such an important test
planned. If UCA 2 is to be useful and meet its full potential in the substations,
its time for the EPRI members to speak up. Let your voices be heard. Make sure the
tests being planned meet your needs. If necessary, run your own actual timing tests.
Simulations are not enough.